

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2402

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3392

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: VISIT OF US EXPERTS TO LONDON

1. USMBFR EXPERTS AND MR DILLERY OF EMB LONDON MET WITH TERRENCE WOOD (FCO), PETER MAYHOW (R&D), PETER GEHRATY (MOD) AND OTHERS AT FCO ON SATURDAY, JUNE 21. UK PASSED TEN QUESTIONS TO US REPS WHICH BRITISH INTEND TO RAISE IN SPC. EXPERTS AND USNATO BELIEVE THAT ALL TEN QUESTIONS CAN BE ANSWERED WITHIN EXISTING GUIDANCE

2. UK REGISTERED POINT OF CONCERN OVER "SECURITY PROBLEM" ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROSPECT OF SPC DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL ASPECT OF POSSIBLE IMPACT OF CONSTRAINTS ON NON-US NATO AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IN EFFECT THIS IMPLIED AN ALLIED "FALLBACK" FROM THE POSITION OF NO CONSTRAINTS ON NON-US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND UK BELIEVED SPC WAS NOT BEST FORUM TO DISCUSS THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.

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3. WOOD OF UK WELCOMED THE US CONTINGENT, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE DISCUSSION MIGHT COVER IDEAS FOR THE SPC WORK PROGRAM, PLUS WHATEVER DIFFICULT POINTS WE FORESAW.

4. LOU MICHAEL REMARKED THAT WE HAD BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THE PAPER WHICH MAR HATTERSLY HAD BROUGHT TO WASHINGTON. AT THE TIME OUR MBFR TEAM HAD LEFT WASHINGTON, THE US RESPONSE WAS NOT YET COMPLETED, BUT HE THOUGHT HE COULD SAY THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE SAID THE US FELT THAT THE PRESENTATIONAL QUESTION NEED NOT POSE ANY PROBLEMS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IN ADVANCING THE "THREATENING ELEMENTS" RATIONALE, THE US VIEWED THE MANPOWER DISPARITY AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF ALLIED CONCERN, AND THE COMMON CEILING AS THE ANSWER. COLONEL WOOD ELABORATED ON THIS POINT, TO THE EVIDENT SATISFACTION OF THE UK OFFICIALS.

5. CEILINGS. MICHAEL REITERATED THE US DETERMINATION TO AVOID ALL CEILINGS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT, AND MR WOOD NOTED THE UK'S PARTICULAR CONCERN TO PROTECT ITS JAGUAR PROGRAM. MR SHARFMAN NOTED THAT US SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF PROPOSING A NSWP TANK FREEZE AROSE MAINLY FROM A FEAR OF EXPOSING OURSELVES TO FURTHER PRESSURE FOR LIMITS ON ALLIED EQUIPMENT.

6. WORKING GROUPS. MR WOOD SUGGESTED THAT SOME STUDIES WOULD BE NEEDED WHICH WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR SPC. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED A STUDY OF THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF ALLIED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS OVER THE COMING YEARS. MR MICHAEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE COULD BE A SECURITY PROBLEM IN DISCUSSING SOMETHING PERTAINING TO A POSSIBLE FALLBACK IN THE SPC. HE SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT ENOUGH F-104GS WOULD BE PHASED OUT BY 1980 TO LEAVE ADEQUATE ELBOW ROOM, BUT HE AND COL. WOOD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE QUESTION WAS A COMPLEX ONE WHICH REQUIRED INPUTS FROM ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. MR WOOD SUGGESTED THAT WHILE THE UK DID NOT INSIST ON USING THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, THERE WERE ADVANTAGES TO HAVING THE IS AVAILABLE TO WRITE UP PAPERS, ETC. MR SHARFMAN COMMENTED THAT USING THE IS COULD ALSO POSE A SECURITY PROBLEM, AND PERHAPS THE STUDIES COULD BE STAFFED WITHIN KEY MISSIONS. MR WOOD APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT WORKING GROUPS COULD BE AD HOC. MR SHARFMAN STATED THAT THE US COULD ACCEPT A DELEGATION OF WORK MOST EASILY IF IT WAS TIGHTLY DEFINED AND LIMITED, AND THE UK OFFICIALS SAID THEY AGREED WITH THIS POSITION.

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7. TIMING. THE UK OFFICIALS APPEARED TO HAVE A GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY THAN THE UK HAS PREVIOUSLY DISPLAYED, AND DID NOT DISPUTE MR MICHAEL'S ASSERTION THAT A PROLONGED DISCUSSION WOULD MAKE SECURITY MORE DIFFICULT AND COULD HAVE OTHER ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES. MR WOOD ASKED WHETHER THE US WAS PREPARED TO CARRY THE DISCUSSION OVER TO SEPTEMBER AND APPEARED A BIT STARTLED WHEN MR SHARFMAN STATED THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO WORK THROUGH AUGUST, BUT HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. THE UK OFFICIALS DID NOT SAY THAT THEY THOUGHT A LATE-JULY COMPLETION WOULD BE UNREASONABLE.

8. EXPERTS. THE UK WILL BE SENDING FOUR EXPERTS TO THE SPC MEETINGS. MR WOOD EMPHASIZED THAT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD

TO STAY LONG, AND THEREFORE HOPED THE US EXPERTS WOULD NOT STAY LONG. WE REPLIED THAT WE ALSO HOPED THIS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY. MR WOOD ASKED WHETHER WE COULD CONSULT AGAIN BEFORE THE SPC MET, AND MR MICHAEL REPLIED THAT WE WOULD TRY, BUT WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW TIME TO CONSULT WITH US AUTHORITIES IN BRUSSELS.

9. SPC WORK PROGRAM. MR WOOD ASKED HOW THE US ENVISAGED THE SPC PROGRAM. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FOCUS DISCUSSION, PERHAPS AROUND DRAFT GUIDANCE. MR MICHAEL PICKED THIS UP, AND SAID THAT THE US INTENDED TO CIRCULATE DRAFT GUIDANCE AFTER AN INITIAL ROUND OF DISCUSSION. THE UK OFFICIALS LIKED THIS IDEA. AND SAID THEY HAD NOT YET PREPARED DRAFT GUIDANCE. MR MICHAEL EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT WANT THE SPC TO WORK THE US VIEWS PAPER. MR SHARFMAN ADDED THAT WE FORESAW AN INITIAL GENERAL DISCUSSION IN WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD SEE THAT THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO THE US APPROACH AND THEN SERIOUS WORK BASED ON DRAFT GUIDANCE COULD BEGIN. THE UK OFFICIALS WONDERED WHETHER THIS WOULD SATISFY THE ALLIES, AND MR MICHAEL SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE DRAFT GUIDANCE TO BE BRACKETED AT FIRST AND PERHAPS BACKED UP BY CERTAIN AD HOC SUPPORTING PAPERS OR ANNEXES. MR WOOD AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD APPROACH, AND SAID HE HOPED THAT THE SPC COULD CONDUCT ITS GENERAL DISCUSSION ON MONDAY, JUNE 23, AND TURN TO DISCUSSION OF ITS WORK PROGRAM JUNE 24.

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 3392

10. THE UK OFFICIALS DISTRIBUTED TEN QUESTIONS ON THE
"US PAPER" AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

US OPTION III PAPER

QUESTIONS

1. PARA 18 - SOVIET FROGS AND SCUDS. THE PAPER ARGUES THAT OPTION III SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS AN "EXCHANGE FOR THE CURRENT ALLIANCE PHASE I OBJECTIVES: THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET ARMY AND WARSAW PACT COMMITMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING". IN THE PAST MANY NATO NATIONS INCLUDING THE UK HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET ARMY SHOULD INVOLVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE 68,000 MEN ON THE STRENGTH OF THAT ARMY AND OF ALL THE UNITS AND FORMATIONS ORGANIC TO IT. IN THE WASHINGTON TRI-LATERALS YOU TOLD US THAT YOU DID NOT WISH TO PRESS THE SOVIETS
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TO WITHDRAW FROGS AND SCUDS AS "NAMED ITEMS" (IN THE WAY THAT MBT ARE SO NAMED) IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUES AS WELL AS BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIABILITY OF OPTION III. WE AGREED WITH YOUR APPROACH, BUT NOTE THAT NO MENTION IS MADE OF THESE FROGS AND SCUDS IN YOUR LATEST PAPER. HAVE YOUR VIEWS OF THIS ISSUE CHANGED?

2. PARAS 31 AND 36 - QUANTITY LIMITATIONS. IF, AS IS SUGGESTED, IN PARA 31 THE US GIVE NO ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF EACH MODEL IN THE AREA, WOULD THEY GIVE TO THE WP THE TOTAL NUMBERS LEFT IN THE AREA OF THE 3 MODELS CONCERNED? IF NOT, HOW DOES THIS TIE UP WITH THE STATEMENT IN PARA 36 THAT THE LIMITATION ON EACH REDUCED ELEMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THE QUANTITY (AS OPPOSED TO QUALITY) OF THAT ELEMENT IN THE AREA?

3. PARAS 32 AND 34 - FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM. THE PAPER STATES IN PARA 32 THAT THE US WANT TO "AVOID COMMITMENT TO ANY SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM FOR TREATING FUTURE AIRCRAFT ADDITIONS TO THE AREA" BUT THAT "THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME WAY FOR THE PACT TO REGISTER ITS OPINIONS IF THE US INTRODUCED INTO THE AREA AIRCRAFT WHICH THE PACT CONSIDERED TO BE NUCLEAR CAPABLE". PARA 34 ALSO STATES THAT THE WEST WOULD WANT "A METHOD AND A BODY OF PRECEDENT FOR QUESTIONING THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW SOVIET TANK MODELS IF THEY SERVED TO OFFSET THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS". COULD THE US PLEASE ELABORATE ON THE PROCEDURES WHICH THEY BELIEVE SHOULD BE USED FOR THE USSR TO CHECK THAT THE INTRODUCTION IN THE YEARS AHEAD OF, SAY, 20 US A-7E AIRCRAFT INTO THE AREA WAS NOT CIRCUMVENTING THE AGREEMENT.

4. PARA 33 - SSM. THE PAPER ADVOCATES THAT LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE PLACED ONLY ON US BALLISTIC SSM LAUNCHES IN THE NGA HAVING RANGES IN EXCESS OF 500 KMS. THE UK HOPES THAT THIS PROPOSAL

WILL PROVE NEGOTIABLE. HOWEVER, IF THE USSR WILL ONLY ACCEPT THE OPTION III PACKAGE PROVIDED THE CONSTRAINTS ARE PLACED ON ALL TYPES OF US SSM LAUNCHERS IN THE AREA, WHAT WOULD BE THE US OBJECTIONS? ARE THEIR CNY PLANS TO INTRODUCE LANCE OTHER THAN ON A 1:1 BASIS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE OLDER SYSTEMS? IF THERE ARE NONE, IS THIS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE COULD SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA?

5. PARA 34 - SOVIET TANKS. WE NOTE THAT THE T.70 TANK IS
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NOT MENTIONED AS A MODEL TO BE CONSTRAINED, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE AS YET WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT NAY TANKS OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED INTO ACTIVE UNIT DUTY IN THE NGA. IF THE SOVIETS DO START TO INTRODUCE T.70 IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF, SAY, T.62 TAKS IN TA POST-MBFR PERIOD, WILL THE T.70 AUTOMATICALLY BE ADDED TO THE NEGOTIATING RECORD? WHAT WOULD BE THE POSITION IF THE SOVIETS STARTED TO INTRODUCE T.70 INTO UNITS IN THE NGA WITHOUT WITHDRAWING ANY OF THEIR OLDER TANKS STATING THAT T.70 WAS AN ANTI-TANK SELF PROPELLED GUN? COULD THE ALLIANCE DEMONSTATE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BROKEN THE LETTER (AS OPPOSED TO THE SPIRIT) OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT?

6. PARA 37 - NO CONSTRAINT DETAILS TO BE GIVEN INITIALLY TO USSE. THE PAPER ADVOCATES THAT NO DETAILS OF THE LIMITATIONS TO BE PROPOSED BY THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE USSR UNTIL WE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN SOME SOVIET REACTION TO THE OPTION III PROPOSAL. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS COURSE PROVIDED WE WERE SATISFIED THAT NATO HAD AGREED THE DETAILS OF ALL POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTED. AS THE PAPER SAYS IN PARA 25, THE EAST MAY DEMAND LIMITATIONS ON NON-US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND IN LOGIC IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST THIS ONCE A PHASE II HAD BEEN AGREED, EVEN IF WE COULD RESIST SUCH A DEMAND IN PHASE I AS IS UGGESTED IN PARA 44. THEREFORE WE WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT THE UK PROGRAMME TO ADD 50 ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO THE STRENGTH OF RAF, GERMANY BY 1978 IS NOT PRECLUDED BY ANY LIMITATION AGREEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM SINCE YOU CONSIDER THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ALLIED NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WILL TEND TO DECREASE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, EVEN INCLUDING THE UK PLANS. WHAT EVIDENCE HAVE YOU GOT TO SUPPORT THIS CONTENTION, SINCE NONE OF OUR ALLIES HAVE ADMITTED TO US THAT THEY ARE REDUCING THEIR CURRENT TACTICAL AIRCRAFT LEVELS OR REPLACING NUCLEAR CAPABLE TYPES BY NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE TYPES BETWEEN NOW AND 1978? IF OUR PROGRAMME CANNOT BE MET THROUGH REDUCTIONS IN OTHER NATO AIR FORCES AND THE USSR INSIST ON RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINTS ON NON-US AIRCRAFT, WHAT ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS CAN YOU MAKE TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENT?

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 3392

7. PARA 38 - US RESERVE TANKS. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN THAT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO REPLACE THE CURRENT TANK DEFICIENCIES IN YOUR RESERVE TANKS, BUT AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MBFR HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH RESERVE EQUIPMENTS AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WISE TO BRING RESERVE EQUIPMENTS OR MANPOWER RESERVES INTO MBFR. WE DO NOT CONSIDER, THEREFORE, THAT YOUR WISH TO REPLACE RESERVE TANKS TOCKS WILL BE JEOPARDISED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPTION III PACKAGE DEAL. ON THE OTHER HAND WE DO SUPPORT YOUR SUGGESTION THAT OPTION III CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A HARD AND FAST CEILING ON US TANKS AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL, WE AGREE YOU MUST HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO ENABLE YOU TO MAKE MODEST INCREASES.

8. PARA 39 - USSR NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. COULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RATIONALE FOR THE STATEMENT THAA THE SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES MOST THREATENING TO WESTERN EUROPE ARE LOCATED OUTISDE THE NGA? IS YOUR STATMENT MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC AS WELL AS OF THEATRE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS?

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9. PARA 42 - USSR NUCLEAR SYSTEM MODELS. COULD THE US PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT TYPES OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT MODELS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEGOTIATION RECORD? HOW CAN WE AVOID PUTTING TOO SEVERE CONCTRAINTS ON THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT PROGRAMME WHICH WE BELIEVE INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF SOME 350 NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY NUCLEAR CAPABLE TYPES OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS?

10. PARA 44 - NSWP TANKS. UNDER THE US PROPOSALS THERE WOULD
BE NO LIMITATION PLACED ON NSWP TANKS, SON IN COURSE OF TIME
(IE IN A POST-MBFR PHASE II EAR) THE NSWP COULD INCREASE THEIR TANK
STRENGTHS TO MAKE GOOD THE SOVIET REDUCTION. THE US SEEM PREPARED
TO ACCEPT THIS IN A POST PHASE I SETTING (OR BETWEEN THE PHASES)
BUT WOULD THEY ACCEPT SUCH A SITUATION IN THE LONGER TERM?
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